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Abstract 
In Canada, temporary workers account for 14 per cent of jobs in the non-farm business 
sector, are present in a range of industries, and account for 40 per cent of the total job 
reallocation. Yet most models of job reallocation abstract from temporary workers. This 
paper evaluates the importance of temporary workers in job reallocation in a multi-sector 
model with costly labour adjustment and temporary workers. The calibrated model 
captures some features of job reallocation in Canada. The paper shows that the 
adjustment cost parameters for permanent workers are underestimated if temporary 
workers are ignored. It also shows that when a shock occurs where permanent workers 
bear the brunt of reallocation (e.g. the 2005-2008 commodity price boom and the 
appreciation of the Canadian dollar), aggregate adjustment costs are underestimated if 
temporary workers are not accounted for. 
JEL classification: D24, J32 
Bank classification: Labour markets; Productivity 
Résumé 
Au Canada, les travailleurs temporaires occupent 14 % des emplois dans le secteur des 
entreprises non agricoles, sont présents dans plusieurs branches d’activité et constituent 
40 % des effectifs touchés par les redistributions d’emplois. Malgré cela, ils sont absents 
de la plupart des modèles utilisés pour formaliser la redistribution des emplois. Les 
auteurs évaluent l’importance de ces travailleurs dans le phénomène à partir d’un modèle 
multisectoriel comportant des coûts d’ajustement élevés du travail et une main-d’œuvre 
temporaire. Ce modèle étalonné reproduit certaines des caractéristiques de la 
redistribution des emplois observées au Canada. Comme le montrent les auteurs, faire 
abstraction des travailleurs temporaires amène à sous-estimer les paramètres des coûts 
d’ajustement calculés pour les travailleurs permanents. Les auteurs montrent également 
que lorsque les travailleurs permanents font les frais de la redistribution des emplois 
après un choc (envolée des prix des matières premières entre 2005 et 2008, appréciation 
du dollar canadien, etc.), les coûts globaux d’ajustement sont sous-estimés si la main-
d’œuvre temporaire n’est pas prise en compte. 
Classification JEL : D24, J32 




Studies have shown that labour adjustment costs play important roles in dynamic
factor demands.1 Labour adjustment costs at the ﬁrm-level also ﬁgure prominently in
a number of economic models used for policy evaluation.2 This paper examines the
role of temporary employment in labour adjustment in Canada. It uses a Canadian
matched employee-employer data setto document the amount of job reallocation due
to temporary workers, the characteristics of workplaces that uses temporary workers,
the change in the intensity of use of temporary workers as the workplace grows, and
the patterns of adjustment of temporary and permanent workers at the establishment
level. It then introduces a multi-sector, general equilibrium model with costly labour
adjustment and temporary workers to help explain how and why temporary em-
ployment is used. The calibrated model is able to capture many of the features of the
Canadian data documented in the paper.
In contrast to permanent employees who have an indeﬁnite contractual relation-
ship, that is protected by employment protection legislation, with their employers,
workers on temporary ﬁxed-term contracts can be removed from payrolls inexpen-
sively when their contracts are completed. Differences in severance costs are not the
only thing that distinguishes permanent workers from temporary ones. Since ﬁxed-
term employees are usually hired for their portable skills and because of their tenure
with the ﬁrm is expected to be short, ﬁrms are less likely to provide training to ﬁxed-
term employees.3 These training costs can be viewed as an adjustment cost because
some of this training might include a ﬁrm-speciﬁc aspect that is necessary for new
employees to learn before they become fully functional at their particular ﬁrm.
The case in Canada is interesting because of the importance of temporary workers
(employees with a ﬁxed termination date - contract employees, casual and seasonal
workers, workersfrom temporaryworkagencies)hasbeenincreasingovertime,from
6.9 per cent of paid employees in 1989 to 14.9 per cent in 2006. Furthermore, the in-
1See for example, Hamermesh (1989), Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1997), Cooper, Halti-
wanger, and Willis (2004) and Varej˜ ao and Portugal (2007).
2See for example, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Alonso-Borrego, Fernandez-Villaverde, and
Galdon-Sanchez (2006) and Tapp (2007).
3Seehttp://human-resources-management.suite101.com/article.cfm/employees contract vs temporary
and J. Turcotte and Montmarquette (2002).3
corporation of ﬁxed-term employment is also interesting because temporary work-
ers account for a large fraction of job reallocation. It is shown in this paper that the
share of job reallocation accounted for by temporary jobs is more than three time
their share in employment in Canada. This suggests that an analysis that does not
distinguish between permanent and temporary workers will tend to underestimate
the importance of adjustment costs when a shock that necessitates the reallocation of
permanent workers occurs.
Anexample of a shock in which permanentworkers would arguably bearthe brunt
of the labour reallocation is the commodity price boom and the associated apprecia-
tion of the Canadian dollar in the 2005-2008 period. This shock is approximated in the
model by increasing the dispersion in sectoral shocks. To ascertain the importance of
incorporating ﬁxed-term employment, the change in the aggregate adjustment costs
to such a change in a model with ﬁxed-term employment can then be compared to
the response in a model without such contracts.
This is not the ﬁrst paper to incorporate temporary employment in the labour
adjustment cost literature. Previous studies focused on the impact of eliminating
temporary contracts on unemployment, output, productivity and welfare in Europe.
Alonso-Borrego, Fernandez-Villaverde, and Galdon-Sanchez (2006) incorporate tem-
porary contracts into a general equilibrium model with labour adjustment cost and
heterogeneous ﬁrms. Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2009) estimate a structural
modelofdynamiclabourdemand(includingtemporarywork) attheﬁrmlevel.Cabrales
and Hopenhayn (1997) examine the response of employment to an aggregate produc-
tivity shock, but in a partial equilibrium model with temporary workers. Our model
studies the ﬁrm’s employment decisions in Canada, where labour employment pro-
tection law is less stringent than in European countries.
There are not many papers studying the costs of labour adjustment in Canada.
Amano (1995) estimates the adjustment cost parameters in a structural model with
the Eulerequation. He ﬁnds that signiﬁcant adjustment costs are an important feature
of Canadian labour demand. Tapp (2007) examines the impact of labour adjustment
costs inCanadafollowing alarge sectoral shock (the recentcommodity price boom)in
a general equilibrium framework, but does not take into account temporary workers.
This paper ﬁnds that ignoring temporary workers leads to estimates of adjustment4
costs parameters for permanent workers that are much lower than when temporary
workers are taken into account. Mimicking the impact of a large sectoral shock by
increasing the dispersion of the sectoral shock in the model economies, itis found that
while job reallocation rises in the model with temporary workers and in the model
without temporary workers, aggregate adjustment costs as a fraction of total output
only rises signiﬁcantly in the model with temporary workers. The main reason for
this difference is that the model with temporary workers allows permanent workers
to account for a higher fraction of job reallocation when there is an increase in the
dispersion of sectoral shocks.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that an increase in the volatility of ﬁrm-level growth rates is a
good candidate to explain the increase in the temporary employment rate in Canada.
This result, however, depends greatly on the nature of the increase in dispersion.
While more persistent shocks encourage the use of permanent workers, an increase
in the standard deviation of the error term in the shock process raises uncertainty and
the use of temporary workers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the Canadian
data sources used in this paper, and presents key facts about temporary workers in
Canada. Section 3 presents the model and section 4 describes the equilibrium. The
calibration of the model is discussed in section 5 and the results are presented in
section 6.
2. JOB REALLOCATION IN CANADA
2.1. Data and Deﬁnitions
The data used to calculate job creation and destruction in this paper comes from
the employer section of Statistics Canada’s Workplace Employee Survey (WES).4 It
is an annual, longitudinal, matched employer-employee survey at the establishment
level. Currently, data from 1999-2005 is available for use. The target population for
the employer component is all establishments in Canada that have paid employees
in March, with the exception of employers in the territories and employers in crop
and animal production, ﬁshing, hunting and trapping, private households, religious
4For a comprehensivedescription of the survey seeGuide tothe Analysis ofthe Workplace andEmployee
Survey - 2004, Statistics Canada, Catalogue no. 71-221-GIE.5
organizations and public administration. The initial sample of 6322 establishments
was drawn from the Business Register (BR) maintained by Statistics Canada in 1999
and has been followed over time. In every odd year after 1999, this initial sample was
supplemented with a sample of newborn establishments that were added to the BR
since the last supplement.
Information on the numberof permanentandtemporary workers in each establish-
ment is taken from the employer part of the survey. Employees are also asked their
terms of employment, but only a sample of employees are surveyed from each estab-
lishment.5 Although better than the employee-based measure, the employer-based
measure is not perfect. Workplaces may differ in who they consider temporary work-
ers. Temporary workers could be employees with a ﬁxed termination date, seasonal
workers, casual workers, workers from a temporary employment agency or indepen-
dent contractors. The effect on the incidence of temporary employment due to the
change in the WES employer questionnaire between 2000 and 2001 is evidence of this
uncertainty. Between the 2000 and 2001 survey, there is a signiﬁcant change in both
the composition of temporary workers and temporary workers as a fraction of all
workers.
To address this uncertainty, data only from 2001 forward is considered and the
most encompassing deﬁnition of temporary work is used. In the 2001 survey and
beyond, establishments are ﬁrst asked their number of employees in the last pay pe-
riod of March, where employee is deﬁned as workers who received a T-4 slip (a slip
for income tax purposes given to the worker by his employer that denotes employ-
ment income, payroll taxes paid, etc.). The establishment is then immediately asked
to split the total number of employees into permanent (those who have no set termi-
nation date) and non-permanent (those with a set termination date or a speciﬁc pe-
riod of employment.6 The questionnaire then asks, ”During the month of March how
many independent contractors (a person providing products or services under con-
tract with the establishment, but do not receive a T-4 from the establishment; workers
5Speciﬁcally, all employees in establishments with less than four employees are surveyed, while in
largerworkplaces asample is selected.Amaximum of 24employees from each workplaceareselected.
6Establishments are also asked to categorize their employees by full or part time status, by union
status, by occupation, and by on or off-site. An examination of job turnover along these lines did not
turn up results as striking as the ones between permanent and temporary workers.6
from temporary employment agencies would be included here) provided products
or services to the establishment.” When dealing with data from the WES, both non-
permanent and independent contractors are considered as temporary employees.
In this paper, only data from establishments that operated in every year during
the 2001-2005 period are used. In other words, the target population is ﬁrms that ex-
isted in 2001 that survived until 2005. This subset of the data is used mainly because
the sample of workplaces is only supplemented every second year and weights in
2002 and 2004 do not take into account the absence of new workplaces in those years.
Therefore, the calculation of reallocation rates for all workplaces would not be pos-
sible. First, the jobs created by entrants between 2001 and 2002, and 2003 and 2004
are not observed. Second, jobs lost by ﬁrms that entered in 2002 and 2004, but exited
before they could be interviewed in 2003 and 2005, respectively, would also not be
observed. Third, since the weights are not updated in 2002 (2004), the 2002 to 2003
(2004 to 2005) reallocation rate would not be for establishments in 2002 (2004), but for
establishments in 2001 (2003) that survived until 2003 (2005). There are 6207 work-
places in the 2001 WES sample, and 4146 of those workplaces were still in existence
in 2005. This gives a 33.2 per cent cumulative exit rate, or a 9.6 per cent geometric
average exit rate.
Job creation and destruction rates presented in this paper follow the standard of
Davis and Haltiwanger (1999). A job is created (destroyed) in a workplace, if the net
change in employment over the year in that workplace is positive (negative). The job
creation (destruction) rate for a workplace is the number of jobs created (destroyed)
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where EMPjt is number of jobs in workplace j at time t, cjt is the workplace’s job
creation rate, and djt is the workplace’s job destruction rate. As noted by Davis and
Haltiwanger (1999), the advantage of using the average of the number of jobs in the
denominator is that the creation and destruction rates are bounded by -2 and 2.
Note that although there may be some hiring and separations in the workplace be-
tween two periods, as long as the net change in jobs is zero, job creation and destruc-7
tion will be zero. Therefore, a temporary worker who has his ﬁxed contract renewed
every year or a temporary worker who is replaced with another temporary worker
after the end of the former worker’s contract would not lead to job creation or de-
struction. Furthermore, since these rates are calculated annually it does not capture
the creation and destruction of temporary seasonal worker.
The aggregate job creation and destruction rates are the weighted sum of each















Thecreation and destruction ofpermanentand temporary jobs atthe establishment
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where n is the number of permanent jobs, l is the number of temporary jobs, cN
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jt) only for workplaces where both permanent and temporary jobs are
rising (njt − njt−1 ≥ 0 and ljt − ljt−1 ≥ 0 ).8





































Then, JCt < JCN
t + JCL
t and JDt < JDN
t + JDL
t unless the sample of workplaces is
restricted to those where the net change in permanent and temporary positions are of
the same sign.
In addition to the WES, this paper also provides some statistics from the General
Social Survey. The General Social Survey (GSS) 1985-2006 is an annual survey of so-
cial trends in Canada. Trends in work, education, retirement, time use, health, family
support, victimization, social networks and use of communications technology are
captured in cycles that rotate in and out of the survey at regular intervals. A question
asking whether one’s current job was permanent or temporary was asked in the Ed-
ucation, Work and Retirement cycles in 1989 and 1994, and in every GSS since 2006.
Themain reason forlooking atthe GSSisthat itaskstemporary workers whetherthey
would prefer a permanent position. This gives some information about whether the
existence of temporary employment is due to the need for ﬂexibility among workers
or ﬁrms. Self-employed independent contractors are not included in the calculation
of the temporary employment rate using the GSS.
2.2. Temporary Jobs and Job Turnover in Canada: Evidence from the WES
Evidence from the WES in Table 1 suggests that temporary jobs affected a non-
trivial number of workers and establishments over the 2001-2005 period. Temporary
jobs as a percentage of all jobs was 13.5 per cent, the percentage of establishments
with temporary jobs was 34.9 per cent and the rate of temporary jobs for establish-
ments with temporary jobs was 33.2 percent. Temporary jobs exist in each of the three
broad industry groupings presented, but they are more concentrated in other goods9
(forestry, mining, oil and gas, construction, and communication and utilities) 7, less
concentrated in manufacturing, and close to average for services.8 The percentage of
jobs that are temporary is high in other goods because a large fraction of establish-
ments have temporary workers (46.8 per cent) and the average rate of temporary jobs
for those establishments with temporary jobs is also relatively high (38.8 per cent).
In manufacturing, the percentage of establishments with temporary jobs is also rela-
tively high (42.4 per cent), but the average rate of temporary jobs is much lower (23.1
per cent). For services, the percentage of establishments with temporary jobs is rela-
tively low (32.4 per cent) but the average rate of temporary jobs (33.8 per cents) falls
between the other two industry groups. Overall, temporary employment is used by
many establishments in a large number of industries. The pervasiveness of tempo-
rary workers across all industries gives support to our idea that temporary workers
play an important role in cross-sector reallocations. Our model, however, is not used
to try to explain cross-industry differences in temporary work.
The plant characteristics that are associated with having at least one temporary
workers are identiﬁed in a probit regression (Table 2, column 1). Consistent with the
notion that businesses use temporary workers to respond better to demand ﬂuctua-
tions, the use of temporary workers is positively related to direct measures of busi-
ness volatility,9 the coefﬁcient of variation of the growth of proﬁts and the coefﬁcient
of variation of the level of proﬁts. The probability of using temporary workers is also
related to indirect measures of volatility. Younger plants, that likely face more uncer-
tainty than older plants, tend to use temporary workers. Likewise, plants that report
having seasonal peaks in output also are more likely to use temporary workers. Tem-
porary workers are also more likely to be found in larger plants with unions. Ono
(2009) argues that larger plants may have more advantages in negotiating with tem-
porary work agencies and that larger plants may face greater penalties when they
dismiss workers. Indeed, Friesen (2005) shows that Canadian employers must give
7Evidence from the LFS presented in Galarneau (2005) suggests that temporary workers were over
represented in agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing, and hunting, and mining, oil and gas, but not utilities.
8Galarneau (2005) also shows that within the service industry, temporary workers were under rep-
resented in ﬁnance, insurance and real estate, trade, and professional, scientiﬁc and technical services,
and over represented in education, and business, building and other support services.
9See Ono and Zelenev (2003), Jin, Ono, and Zhang (2007) and Ono (2009), for example.10
more notice when they lay off a greater number of workers, something that is more
likely to occur in larger plants than in smaller plants. The positive correlation be-
tween the use of temporary workers and the presence of a collective bargaining unit
is at odds with past ﬁndings. However, while unions may resist the use of temporary
workers, adjustment costs may also be higher in the presence of unions.
Table 2, column 2 shows that, conditional on having at least one temporary job,
younger plants, with seasonal peaks in output, with a higher coefﬁcient of variation
in their level of revenues tend to have a higher temporary worker employment rate.
The OLS regression (without ﬁxed effects) also suggests that, conditional on having
at least one temporary job, the temporary employment rate falls with plant size. That
is to say, the number of temporary workers employed does not grow proportionately
with plant size.
Table 3 shows the distribution of workplaces across net change in permanent and
temporary job categories. Even at an annual frequency, there is a high percentage of
establishments that do not change the number of permanent jobs. For all industries,
29.1 per cent of establishments do not alter the number of permanent jobs over the
year. Manufacturing and other goods exhibit less inaction at 22.1 per cent and 24 per
cent respectively, while services exhibit slightly more at 30.6 per cent. The percentage
of establishments that do not change the number of temporary jobs is even higher,
but this is not surprising as the majority of establishments do not have any temporary
jobs. The pattern across industries in the fraction of establishment not changing both
permanent and temporary workers is similar to the one for inaction in permanent
jobs alone.
The 8.9 percent of establishments that change the numberof temporary, but not the
number of permanent jobs are roughly equally distributed among those that increase
and decrease temporary jobs. This is in line with the notion that temporary jobs are
used to help establishments deal with transitory, idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations in their
demand. Among the establishments that increase the number of permanent work-
ers, more than one-half increase both permanent and temporary jobs, approximately
one-third only increase permanent jobs and the remainder decrease temporary jobs.
The ﬁnding that there are some establishments that decrease temporary jobs while in-
creasing permanent ones could be the result of changing perceptions on the nature of11
a shock. For example, perhaps last year’s positive shock is now viewed as more long
lasting. Interestingly, among establishments that decreased the number of permanent
jobs, the fraction that also increased and decreased temporary jobs is roughly equal.
The asymmetry seen among the group of establishments that increased permanent
jobs does not exist here perhaps because many establishments do not have any tem-
porary jobs to begin with. The model presented in this paper is able to replicate most,
but not all of these situations.
Overall, the correlation between the change in the number of permanent jobs and
the change in the number of temporary jobs is -0.38. This negative correlation at the
mirco level is another feature our model is able to reproduce.
Table 4, column 1 gives the median growth in revenues for three types of plants:
plants that increase permanent workers, plants that do not adjust permanent work-
ers, and plants that decrease permanent workers. Plants that increase the number
of permanent workers they employ have a median revenue growth of 8.4 per cent.
This is 6.1 percentage points higher than the median growth rate for plants that do
not change, and 9.4 percentage points higher than the median growth rate of plants
that decrease the number of permanent workers they employ. The range of revenue
growth rates is much narrower in the case of temporary workers (4, column 2). It is
5.3 per cent for plants that increase, 3.4 per cent for ﬁrms that do not change and 2.8
per cent for ﬁrms that decrease the number of temporary workers they employ. This
is consistent with the notion that adjustment costs make it difﬁcult for plants to ad-
just to smaller ﬂuctuations by changing the number of permanent workers, so they
use temporary workers instead. The number of permanent workers is only changed
in face of larger shocks, when the beneﬁt of increasing or decreasing the number of
permanent employees outweighs the effect of adjustment costs.
The top panel of Table 5 presents the job creation and job destruction numbers
for all industries. Over the 2001-2005 period, the average annual rate of job creation
was 10.2 per cent while the rate of job destruction was 9.2 per cent. These ﬁgures are
similar in magnitude to the ones found by Balakrishnan (2008) and Cao and Leung
(2010) using Canadian ﬁrm-level data. 10 The rates of permanent job creation and
10Balakrishnan (2008) reports a job creation rate of 10.8 per cent and a job destruction rate of 8.8
per cent in the total economy of the 1999-2004 period. Cao and Leung (2010) ﬁnd a job creation rate12
destruction (8.1 per cent and 6.4 per cent, respectively) are higher than the rate of
temporary job creation and destruction (5.3 per cent and 6.2 per cent, respectively).
This is to be expected because the majority of establishments do not have temporary
jobs and the share of temporary jobs in total jobs is relatively small.
As noted in the previous section, the job creation rates for permanent and tem-
porary workers do not sum to the overall job creation rate. This is due to the exis-
tence of establishment-year observations where the change in the number of perma-
nent and temporary jobs do not have the same sign. To obtain a sense of the impor-






JCL+JCN+JDL+JDN. These calculations suggest that, temporary jobs account for 40 per
cent of the job creation, 49 per cent of the job destruction, and 44 per cent of the job
reallocation. Alternatively, one could restrict the sample of establishment-year obser-
vations to the ones where the net change in permanent and temporary jobs have the
same sign. The results of this exercise are shown in the bottom panel of Table 5 and
lead to the same conclusions. The creation of temporary jobs accounts for 3.1 percent-
age points of the 8.2 per cent job creation rate, or 38 per cent. Similarly, the destruc-
tion of temporary jobs account for 42 per cent of the job destruction rate. Although
temporary jobs only account for 13.5 per cent of all jobs, temporary jobs account for
roughly 40 per cent of job reallocation. In other words, the reallocation accounted for
by temporary jobs is three times their share in the total number of jobs. 11
Tables 6, 7, and 8 present similar numbers for manufacturing, other goods and
services. The reallocation rate in other goods is much higher than in manufacturing,
butthe rate inservices isclose to the aggregate rate. Recallthatthis isthe samepattern
asexhibited in the fraction oftemporary jobs in total jobs. In each ofthe three industry
groups andusing both type of calculations, the reallocation oftemporary jobs account
for a large share of the industry job reallocation rates. Temporary jobs account for
of 10.0 per cent and a job destruction rate of 8.6 per cent in the business sector over the 2001-2005
period. These two studies use ﬁrm-level data, so one might expect the rates based on plants to be
higher. However, this paper concentrates on continuing plants and reallocation due to entry or exit is
not captured.
11The ﬁnding that the reallocation accounted for by temporary jobs is three times their share in the
total number of jobs holds even when the deﬁnition of temporary employment excludes independent
contractors.13
roughly 34, 50 and 42 per cent of the job reallocation in manufacturing, other goods
and services, respectively. The share of reallocation accounted for by temporary jobs
is approximately four times its share in total jobs in manufacturing, two times its
share in other goods, and three times its share in services.
2.3. Temporary Employment in Canada: Evidence from the GSS
According to the GSS, the rate of temporary employment rose from 6.9 per cent to
8.9 per cent between 1989 and 1994, and from 8.9 per cent to 14.9 per cent between
1994 and 2006.12 This compares to the rate of 13.5 per cent rate in the WES (2001-
2005) where temporary work was deﬁned more broadly. Thus the data from the WES
is broadly in-line with data from other sources. As mentioned in the previous sec-
tion, the 1989 and 1994 GSS also asks whether the individuals with temporary jobs
would prefer a permanent one. The majority of temporary workers reply that they
would prefer a permanent position and that fraction is rising over time. In 1989, 61
percent of temporary workers desired a permanentposition, and in 1994that fraction
increased to 72.3 per cent. This supports our decision to model temporary employ-
ment as something demanded by ﬁrms to improve ﬂexibility rather than something
demanded by workers. In addition, a recent paper by Zeytinoglu, Cooke, and Mann
(2009) using the WES data also concludes that ﬂexible work schedules (long work-
weeks, ﬂextime, compressed workweek, variable workweek length and/or variable
workweek schedules) are created for business reasons rather than individual worker
interests.
3. MODEL
In this section, we provide a simple model of ﬁrm hiring and ﬁring to replicate
ﬁndings presented in the previous section. In the model economy, one homogeneous
good, which can be used for consumption or investment, is produced by a large
number of ﬁrms distributed across sectors. Firms rent capital from individuals on
12The 14.9 per cent in 2006 from the GSS is larger than the 13.2 per cent calculated using the 12-
month average of temporary employment rates from the 2006 Labour Force Survey. The discrepancy
is due to the fact that the 2006 GSS collected information between June and October, months when
seasonal work is more prevalent. Data for the 1989 and 1994 GSS was collected throughout the year.14
the capital market and choose the optimal employment. The proﬁt residual is dis-
tributed equally to individuals. Let E,Z,K be subsets on the real line consisting of
non-negative values. The production function is given by13
f(ε,k,n,l,zj) = zjεγkα(n + θl)γ,
where ε ∈ E is the idiosyncratic productivity shock at the ﬁrm level, zj ∈ Z is the
sectoral shock in sector, j, k ∈ K are physical capital, n ∈ R+ ∪ {0} is the number of
permanent workers with indeﬁnite-term contracts, and l ∈ R+∪{0} is the numberof
temporary workers with ﬁxed-term or temporary contracts. The production function
exhibits decreasing return to scale, α + γ < 1, which is needed for a non-degenerate
size distribution of ﬁrms. The ﬁrm’s state is deﬁned on the product space E × Z ×
R+ ∪ {0}. The idiosyncratic shock follows an AR(1) process as follows
lnεt = ρε lnεt−1 + ηt,
where ρε < 1 and ηt ∼ N(0,σ2
η). Let J be the number of sectors. The transition of
sectoral shocks follows a discrete Markov chain. Idiosyncratic shocks and sectoral
shocks are uncorrelated.
We assume that the permanent workers and temporary workers are paid the same
wage rate. Ex ante all workers are the same. The trade-off between the two types
of worker is made based on differences in efﬁciency and differences in labour ad-
justment costs. We assume that θ < 1, and temporary workers are less efﬁcient than
permanent workers. While the efﬁciency of the two types of workers differs, the aver-
age labour productivity of the two types of worker are equal. However, the marginal
productivity of permanent workers is larger than that of temporary workers when
the amounts of the two types are equal.
There is no entry and exit in this model. However, we allow ﬁrms to be inactive
by choosing zero employment. This assumption is based on the fact that capital is
generally not scrapped when plants and ﬁrms exit, rather the plants and ﬁrms are
sold to new owners.
13The labour structure speciﬁed here is the same as that used in models by Alonso-Borrego,
Fernandez-Villaverde, and Galdon-Sanchez (2006), Cabrales and Hopenhayn (1997), and Campbell
and Fisher (2004).15
There is ample evidence in previous studies that non-convex adjustment is neces-
sary to match job turnover patterns at the ﬁrm level. In our model, the adjustment





τf1 + τf2w[(1 − q)nt−1 − nt], if nt < (1 − q)nt−1,
0, if (1 − q)nt−1 ≤ nt ≤ (1 + q)nt−1,
τh1 + τh2[nt − (1 + q)nt−1], if nt > (1 + q)nt−1.
Since worker initiated separations, such as quits and retirements, are observed in
reality, we assume that the ﬁrm does not pay adjustment costs if the employment
change is less than qnt−1. The above adjustment cost structure is consistent with the
literature.14
Labouradjustment costs not onlyinclude the cost of setting upa hiring team,sever-
ance payments for ﬁred workers and job posting costs, they may also include produc-
tion disruptions, and the cost of training. Costs may be incurred even when employ-
ment levels do not change. For example, it may take some time for a new worker to
reach the same level of efﬁciency as the departed worker, see Hamermesh and Pfann
(1996) and Cooper and Willis (2009) for more detailed interpretations.
The essential distinction between temporary and permanent employment relation-
ships in our model is not the length of the contract but rather the difference in the cost
of hiring and ﬁring. This difference creates different contract terms between perma-
nent workers and temporary workers. In the model, ﬁrms do not incur adjustment
costs when they change their levels of temporary employment per se. Instead, ﬁrms
pay a cost (in addition to the wage) to use temporary workers, and this cost is propor-
tional to the number of temporary workers it uses, τlt. This cost of using temporary
workers may be due to the organizational differences of production when one mixes
permanent workers and temporary workers. It may also arise from additional human
resources costs required to continually roll-over temporary employment contracts.
14Abowd and Kramarz (2003) estimate the shape of hiring and separation costs with matched
French data. They ﬁnd that both retirement and termination costs are increasing and mildly concave
in the number of separated workers. Fixed costs are very large. Hiring costs also have a large ﬁxed
component and are mildly concave. Hiring costs are much smaller than separation costs. Estimates
from other papers also ﬁnd that non-convexity is present, see Hamermesh (1989), Cooper and Willis
(2009), among others.16
The implicit assumption here is that temporary employment contracts hold only
for one period, which sounds extreme. For example, some temporary contracts may
berenewedafterone period. Thisassumption neverthelessisasimpliﬁcation ofﬁxed-
term employment contracts. By restricting the model to one-period employment, we
implicitly assume that contract renewal is taken as a new contract and must be signed
at a cost that equals to the cost of hiring a new temporary worker.
We ignore the promotion of temporary workers to permanent jobs. If costless pro-
motion is allowed, ﬁrms have an incentive to ﬁrst hire temporary workers, and then
promote them to permanent workers, thereby avoiding the adjustment costs of hir-
ing permanent workers. For example, in the calibrated model of Alonso-Borrego,
Fernandez-Villaverde, and Galdon-Sanchez (2006), the majority of new hires are tem-
porary workers.
Finally, to close the model, a representative household exists to make consumption






βt[u(ct) − ξ(Lt + Nt)]
 
,
where ct > 0 is consumption in period t. The instantaneous utility function satisﬁes
u′(ct) > 0,u′′(ct) < 0 and limct→0+ = ∞. The household supplies Lt and Nt amounts
of temporary and permanent work, respectively.
4. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
Before studying the model’s equilibrium properties, it should be noted that the sec-
toral shocks are important for both the stationarity of the long-run equilibrium and
for how the equilibrium is computed. We assume that sectoral shocks are uncorre-
lated and that the model economy has a sufﬁcient number of sectors such that the
law of large numbers applies. Since one particular sector is too small to inﬂuence the
equilibrium prices, the equilibrium is stationary. In contrast, if the economy consists
of only a small number of sectors or the sectoral shocks move together, the equi-
librium price is likely to ﬂuctuate, because co-moving sectoral shocks inﬂuence the
model economy in a way similar to that of an aggregate shock.17
4.1. Firm’s optimal decisions
Since there are noadjustment costs associated with temporary workers, the optimal
choice on temporary workers is obtained by solving the following static problem:
R(ε,n,zj) = max
k,l
f(ε,k,n,l,zj) − rk − (w + τ)l.













− n, if l∗ > 0,
0, otherwise.










Let n−1 be the employment level of a ﬁrm at the beginning of the current period
before decisions are made. Deﬁne the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function as
π(ε,n,n−1,zj) = R(ε,n,zj) − g(n−1,n) − wn.
The recursive formulation of the ﬁrm’s dynamic problem is







where i is the real interest rate. It should be noted that the adjustment of employment
has no time to build.
PROPOSITION 1 There existsa lower thresholdvalue n and an upper threshold value n such





n(ε,n−1,zj;µ), if n−1 < n(ε,n−1,zj;µ),
n−1, if n−1 ∈ [n(ε,n−1,zj;µ),n(ε,n−1,zj;µ)],
n(ε,n−1,zj;µ), if n−1 > n(ε,n−1,zj;µ)
Conditional on adjusting employment, the optimal employment adjustment is independent of
the current level of employment.18
The proof is in Appendix A. This proposition shows that a ﬁrm’s decision on the
number of permanent workers to employ follows an (S,s) rule. If the marginal value
of employing another permanent worker is lower than some cut-off value, a ﬁrm
changes the number of permanent workers employed such that the marginal value of
permanent workers at the new employment level is equal to the hiring cost τh. Condi-
tional on hiring, the marginal cost ofhiring isindependentof the current employment
level. Thus, the optimal number of permanent workers to employ is also indepen-
dent of the current employment level, and determined by the particular shock it has
drawn. The ﬁring decision of a ﬁrm is similar. Given the monotonicity of a ﬁrm’s
value function (without ﬁring and hiring costs), a ﬁrm will not adjust its amount of
permanent workers if the current employment level of these workers is between the
cut-off values. This is because the marginal ﬁrm values are not equal to the constant
marginal costs. Finally, due to the ﬁxed cost of changing permanent workers, ﬁrms
that are not able to hire or ﬁre permanent works will resort to temporary workers.
The distribution over the ﬁrm’s state space is a measure µ deﬁned on the σ-algebra
of all the open sub-sets of the product space Z × S where S = E × R+ ∪ {0}. Let
Q(s,zj;s′,z′
j) bethetransition matrixfrom state(s,zj) tostate (s′,z′
j), andlet P(ε,zj;ε′,z′
j)
be the transition matrix of the exogenous shocks. The law of motion for the distribu-














j)1{n=n(s,zj;µ)}, if n ∈ R+ ∪ {0};
0, otherwise.
The wage rate and the interest rate are determined by the distribution of ﬁrms. The
optimal policy function for permanent workers is n = n(s,zj;µ).













[max{0,n(ε,n−1,zi) − n−1} + |min{0,n(ε,n−1,zi) − n−1}|]dµj(ε,n−1).19













[max{0,l(ε,l−1,zi) − l−1} + |min{0,l(ε,n−1,zi) − l−1}|]dµj(ε,n−1),
where l−1 = l(ε,n−1,zj) is the demand for temporary workers at the beginning of
the current period, before the ﬁrm makes its decision on the number of permanent
workers to employ.
4.2. Households
We assume that the period utility function of the household is u(c) = c1−ψ
(1−ψ). The
household cannot borrow, but it owns the capital used by ﬁrms. The household’s
consumption and saving decisions are made in the following recursive problem:
(4) H(K,µ) = max
c,K′ {u(c) − ξ(L + N) + βH(K′,µ′)}
subject to:






where Tr is the lump sum transfer from the government, and w is the wage rate.
Members of the representative household have the same labour productivity. The
fraction of members that become permanent or temporary workers is determined
by the ﬁrm’s production technology and by labour adjustment costs. Members also
move freely from one sector to another.15
4.3. Steady-state equilibrium
In steady state, the aggregate state of the economy (K, N,µ) and the equilibrium
prices (i∗,r∗,w∗) are constant over time. A steady-state competitive equilibrium is
deﬁned as:
15An extension to the current setup is to impose costly sectoral reallocation of permanent workers.
In this case, the worker distribution across sectors becomes a state variable.20
• Firms solve equation (1), taking equilibrium prices as given. The policy func-
tions are n = n(s),l = l(s),k′ = k′(s).
• The household solves equation (4), taking equilibrium prices as given. The pol-
icy function is K′ = K′(K,µ), L∗, and N∗.
• The markets for capital, labour and consumption clear as following
L∗ = Ld, N∗ = Nd
K′ = K∗






zjεγkα(n + θl)γ − a(k,k′(s))dµj(s)
• Tax revenue equals to the lump sum transfer Tr.






Inthe steadystate, (1+i) = 1
β. From the household’sﬁrst-order necessary conditions,
uc =
ξ
w and (1 + r − δ) = 1
β.
In this steady-state competitive equilibrium, the only unknown aggregate variable
is the wage rate w. The equilibrium is computed in two loops. First, for a given value
of the wage rate, the value of a ﬁrm is obtained by solving Equation (1). When solving
the ﬁrm’s problem, the interest rate and capital rental rate are given by the ﬁrst-order
conditions of the representative household. The invariant distribution of the ﬁrms is
then obtained. Second, aggregate consumption is calculated and then the aggregate
resource feasibility constraint is checked.
5. CALIBRATION
5.1. Parameters
The model is calibrated to annual Canadian data. Parameter values are chosen to
replicate the main features of the Canadian economy. The capital-output ratio and
investment output ratio are, respectively, 1.69 and 0.12 (see Baldwin, Fisher, Gu, Lee,
and Robidoux (2008)). In the steady state, investment just replenishes depreciated
capital, so this implies a depreciation rate of capital of 0.071. The interest rate i is set
to the commonly used value of 4 per cent, which means that the discount factor for21
the household is β = 0.9615. The share of labour in Canadian national income is 0.62,
hence γ = 0.62. The capital share α is proportional to the capital stock to output ratio,
as shown in the following equation




Together with the values for the interest rate and the depreciation rate mentioned
above, this implies that α = 0.19. We choose θ = 0.865, so that temporary workers are
less productive than permanent workers.
The preference parameter ξ is chosen so that the fraction of the working-age pop-
ulation that is employed in Canada is 74 percent. Given production parameters, this
implies that ξ = 0.9367.
The idiosyncratic shock process is estimated using WES.16 The idiosyncratic shock
has an estimated serial correlation of 0.736, and the standard deviation of the error
term in the AR(1) process is 0.614. The estimated standard deviation is high com-
pared to that found in other studies using U.S. plant-level data. Therefore, a lower
standard deviation of 0.300 was chosen. We discretize the ﬁrm-level shock following
the method of Adda and Cooper (2003). The transition matrix for the sectoral shocks
is estimated using the Canadian KLEMS data. The estimated serial correlation of sec-
toral shocks is 0.811, and the standard deviation of the error term is 0.015.17
For labor adjustment costs, we set τf2 to be 0.25, so that the severance payment
is equivalent to 3 months of salary. Furthermore, we assume that the ﬁxed costs of
hiring and ﬁring are equal, τf1 = τh1, as we focus on the steady state equilibrium
in which hiring and ﬁring must be equal. We then estimate τh1, τh2 and τ using the
method of moments. The set of moments includes the fraction of plants hiring tempo-
rary workers, the share of temporary workers in total employment, the job creation
and destruction rates for all workers, temporary workers and permanent workers,
and the fraction of plants that do not change their numbers of permanent workers.
16The production function is ﬁrst estimated using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Since capital stock
is not available in the WES, industry capital stock is used in the place of plant-level capital. Plant-level
multifactor productivity estimates are then obtained. An AR(1) process for multifactor productivity is
then estimated. Industry dummies are entered into this ﬁnal regression to capture sectoral shocks.
17Theestimatedtransition matrixonly takesinto accountchangeswithin agiven sector.Cross-sector
differences were picked up using sector-speciﬁc constants and trends.22
The estimated parameter values are τh1 = 0.347, τh2 = 0.129 and τ = 0.105. These
parameter values are used for the results of the baseline model.
5.2. Baseline calibration
The baseline model performs well in matching all the moments of job turnover.
Table 9 compares the moments of job reallocation in the model and those in data.
Compared to the data, the model has a higher job reallocation rate for temporary
workers, but a smaller temporary employment rate. The aggregate labour adjustment
cost is 4.2 per cent of total output in the steady state, which is consistent with other
empirical estimates. It should be noted that in our model the adjustment cost for
capital is zero. The labor adjustment cost can be lower than 4 percent if we think that
some portion of job reallocation arises from the ﬁrm’s investment decisions, and the
ﬁrm’s capital adjustment cost is not zero.
Unlike the data, the job creation and destruction rates are equal in the model be-
cause the model focuses on the steady state equilibrium. Furthermore, as in the data,
the sum of the job reallocation rates for permanent and temporary workers is less
than the total job reallocation rate. The model also reproduces the negative correla-
tion between the changes in permanent and temporary workers at the micro level.
This means that the model does have ﬁrms that simultaneously increase the num-
ber of one type of worker and decrease the number of the other type of worker. This
is mainly caused by the heterogeneity in productivity levels of ﬁrms and the ﬁxed
cost of hiring temporary workers. Due to the non-convexity of adjustment cost, ﬁrms
can change the number of permanent employees without changing the number of
temporary employees, and vice versa.
The job turnover for both types of employment is jointly determined by the na-
ture of productivity shocks and the structure of the adjustment costs. For example,
the ﬁxed labour adjustment cost for permanent workers is crucial in order to match
the job reallocation rates for both types of workers and the fraction of temporary em-
ployment. If we turn off the ﬁxed adjustment cost by setting τf1 = τh1 = 0, ﬁrms no
longer hire temporary workers and the fraction of ﬁrms that do not hire and ﬁre per-
manent workers is much smaller than seen in the data. The importance of the ﬁxed
adjustment cost for permanent workers is intuitive. When a ﬁrm is hit by a produc-23
tivity shock, it tends to hire or ﬁre more temporary workers because hiring and ﬁring
permanent workers is more costly than temporary workers. If the adjustment cost
for permanent worker is eliminated, ﬁrms tend to hire or ﬁre permanent workers,
and stop hiring temporary workers because temporary workers are less effective in
production.
To better understand the workings of the model, Figure 1 presents an average ﬁrms
choice of permanent and temporary workers for different idiosyncratic shocks, given
a particular sector shock. The average ﬁrm in the calibrated model hires n = 0.71
permanent workers. The presence of adjustment costs means that there is a range of
idiosyncratic shocks, 0.53 to 2.6, where the ﬁrm will not change its number of per-
manent workers. However, there are shocks within this range of inaction in terms of
permanent works, where temporary workers are employed. An idiosyncratic shock
between 1.62 and 2.6 is not large enough for the ﬁrm to increase their permanent
workforce, but it is sufﬁcient to cover the costs of employing temporary workers. If
the average ﬁrm receives a shock that is greater than 2.6, it will employ more per-
manent workers, and drop all its temporary workers if any were being employed (it
would have had temporary workers if its previous shock was between 1.62 and 2.6).
If the average ﬁrm receives a shock below 0.53, it would ﬁre permanent workers and
not reemploy any temporary workers. Note that the model captures all of the em-
ployment change situations shown in Table 3 except two. Firms in the model do not
increase temporary and permanent workers in the same year, and they do not ﬁre
permanent workers and hire temporary workers in the same year.
The role of temporary employment can be examined by supposing that all workers
are permanent. With no temporary workers, in order to match the total job realloca-
tion rates, the adjustmentcost parametersfall signiﬁcantly, τh1 = 0.17and τh2 = 0.068.
This generates the same job reallocation rates as those in the baseline, as shown in the
last column of Table 9. The value of the hiring cost needed to match the job creation
and destruction rates for all workers is much smaller, close to the half of the hiring
cost parameters of the baseline calibration. This demonstrates that although tempo-
rary workers are a small fraction of the total employment, treating temporary work-
ers as permanent signiﬁcantly downward biases the estimates of labour adjustment
costs for permanent workers. This implies that, to properly evaluate the change in24
welfare when permanent workers are affected disproportionately (because of labour
market policy or a shock), a model must take into consideration the role of temporary
employment.
Finally, the equilibrium total adjustment cost in the model without temporary em-
ployment is 4.7 per cent of total output, a small increase relative to the 4.2 per cent in
the baseline model. Although the adjustment cost parameters are lower in the model
without temporary workers, these costs now apply to every worker that is reallo-
cated. In the model with temporary workers, the higher adjustment costs only ap-
plied to a fraction the reallocation.
6. MODEL IMPLICATIONS FOR JOB REALLOCATION
In this section, we depart from the baseline model and examine the changes in
job reallocation for both permanent and temporary employment in response to the
changes in ﬁrm-level and sectoral shocks, as well as the adjustment costs.
6.1. Labour adjustment costs and temporary workers
When the hiring and ﬁring of permanent workers becomes more costly, our model
suggests that ﬁrms should increase the use of temporary workers. The share of tem-
porary workers in total employment is expected to increase if adjustment costs for
permanentworkers increase. Inthissub-section, we increase theﬁring cost forperma-
nent workers by 10 percent from the baseline case. Table 10 summarizes the changes
in the moments generated by the model. The marginal cost of hiring permanent
worker is the wage, the adjustments costs today, and the change to the expected ad-
justment costs tomorrow. An increase in the variable cost of ﬁring, raises the last
of these terms, the cost of adjusting permanent employment downward in the fu-
ture. For each state (previous permanent employment, and sector and idiosyncratic
shock), the number of permanent workers employed is lower than in the baseline
case. Therefore, aggregate permanent employment and the equilibrium wage rate
falls. The temporary employment rate increases because the decrease in the wage and
fewer permanent workers per ﬁrm means ﬁrms will hire more temporary workers as25
per section 4.1.18 Naturally, greater ﬁring costs increase the range of shocks ﬁrm are
willing to face without changing permanent workers, and when they do need to hire
more permanent workers they do not hire as many. This leads to a lower reallocation
rate of permanent workers. The greater number of temporary workers per ﬁrm in
ﬁrms that have temporary workers leads to more reallocation in temporary workers.
Finally, although there is an increase in the variable ﬁring cost parameter (τf2), total
adjustment costs as a fraction of output does not change. This is because ﬁrms make
less frequent adjustments in permanent workers and because the equilibrium wage
has fallen. Recall that the variable ﬁring cost is a proportion of the wage.
6.2. Firm-level volatility and job reallocation
Inthis section we study how productivity shocks at the ﬁrm-level affect the amount
of job reallocation. In particular, we examine the change in the incidence of temporary
employment and change in job reallocation when there is an increase in the volatil-
ity of the ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic shock process. The volatility of the shock can increase
because of an increase in the serial correlation coefﬁcient of the productivity shock
and an increase in the standard deviation of the error term in the shock process. Em-
pirical evidence from the Report on Business shows that, between the mid 1990s and
the early 2000s, the standard deviation of the sales growth among Canadian ﬁrms
increased by roughly 10 per cent. The change in the serial correlation of the shock
process and the change in the standard deviation of the error term needed to obtain
a 10 per cent increase in the standard deviation of the shock process are calculated.19
For each of the changes, the effects on the moments generated by the model is then
18Table 10 also shows that there is no change in the number of ﬁrms that hire temporary workers.
It would be expected that greater ﬁring cost would increase the range of shocks ﬁrm face could face
before changing their number of permanent workers. This would increase the number of situations
where a ﬁrm would use temporary workers and hence the number of ﬁrms that hire temporary work-
ers should rise. The fact that no increase is shown in Table 10 is likely due to the coarseness of the grid
for idiosyncratic and sector shocks.
19Empirical evidence from the Report on Business data set shows that between the mid-1990s and
the early 2000s, the volatility of the sales growth among Canadian ﬁrms increased by roughly 10 per
cent. The Report on Business data set covers publically-trade and large private ﬁrms in Canada. The
volatility of sales growth is calculated following Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006).26
obtained, as shown in Table 11.
In either case, there are more ﬁrms in the outer parts of the distribution of idiosyn-
cratic shocks. The convex nature of the policy function, as shown in Figure 1, means
that the increase in the number of permanent workers due to ﬁrms with higher pro-
ductivity shocks outweighs the decrease in the number of permanent workers due
to ﬁrms with lower productivity shocks. Hence, the equilibrium wage and aggregate
employment rises.
Greater serial correlation in the shock process implies further that ﬁrms receiving
a positive productivity shock are more likely to have good productivity in the future,
and ﬁrms receiving a bad productivity shock are more likely to stay at lower levels
of productivity. This lowers the expected cost of ﬁring for ﬁrms that receive positive
productivity shocks, and lowers the expected cost of hiring for ﬁrms that receive neg-
ative productivity shocks. As a result, the range of shocks where ﬁrms do not adjust
their number of permanent workers shrinks at both ends. Firms are more likely to
both hire and ﬁre than in the baseline case. Furthermore, given the same previous
level of permanent workers and the same change in productivity, ﬁrms will adjust
by more than in the baseline case. The larger, more frequent changes in the number
of permanent workers raises the reallocation rate of permanent workers. Firms that
have temporary workers use fewer temporary workers because given the same state,
the number of permanent workers per ﬁrm is higher than in the baseline case, and be-
cause the equilibrium wage is higher. As suggested by Figure 1, the higher fraction of
ﬁrms with temporary workers is due to the greater number of ﬁrms with higher pro-
ductivity shocks.20 Overall, however, the temporary employment rate falls because of
the increase in permanent employment and the decrease in temporary employment
among ﬁrms with temporary workers.
If the volatility of the idiosyncratic shock rises because of an increase in the stan-
dard deviation of the error term in the shock process, then the mechanics are slightly
different. The probability of maintaining either a high or low productivity level into
20Note, however, that this result depends on how the distribution of shocks change, as ﬁrms with
the highest productivity shocks do not hire temporary workers. As long as the increase in the mass
of ﬁrms in the highest productivity classes is smaller proportionately than the increase in ﬁrms in
the higher productivity classes, there should be an increase in the fraction of ﬁrms with temporary
workers.27
the future falls. Firms that draw a positive productivity shock, hire less often and
hire less when they do hire because the expected cost of ﬁring in the future rises. Sim-
ilarly, ﬁrms thatreceive a lowproductivity draw,ﬁre lessoften and ﬁre lesswhenthey
do ﬁre because the expected cost of hiring in the future rises. As a result, given the
same combination of shocks and the same previous level of permanent employment,
a lower level of permanent employment relative to the baseline model is chosen.21
The greater uncertainty raises the probability of getting a low or a high productivity
shock, but it also raises the range of shocks that ﬁrms are willing to face before they
make a change in permanent workers. The former effect out weighs the latter, as job
reallocation of permanent workers rises relative to the baseline. The temporary em-
ployment rate rises in the case of an increase in the standard deviation of the error
term in the shock process because given the same state, fewer permanent workers
are employed than in the baseline and hence more temporary workers are employed.
The incidence of using temporary workers also rises because the range of inactivity
widens. Both the greater incidence and intensity of temporary worker use (the rate of
temporary employment for ﬁrms that have temporary employees) leads to more job
reallocation of temporary workers.
Overall, the results in this section suggest that a rise in the volatility faced by ﬁrms
may play a role in the increase in temporary employment over time. To conﬁrm this
hypothesis, measures of ﬁrm volatility covering a broader range of ﬁrms need to be
found.
6.3. Effects of sectoral shocks
In recent decades, the Canadian economy experienced large changes in relative
prices across sectors. Cao and Leung (2010) ﬁnd that the dispersion of industry em-
ployment growth rates have been elevated since 2005, and that this increase is largely
accounted for by the appreciation in the real exchange rate and increase in commod-
ity prices. Cyclical factors account for little of the increased dispersion. In this exper-
iment, we examine the effects of sectoral shocks on job reallocation. We choose the
dispersion of sectoral shocks to match the 25 per cent increase in the sectoral job re-
21Aggregate permanent employment is still higher because there are more ﬁrms with higher pro-
ductivity shocks.28
allocation rate post-2005 (compared to the years immediately prior to this period). In
the baseline calibration, the job reallocation rate measured with sectoral employment
changes is 3.4 per cent. We ﬁnd that increasing the standard deviation of sectoral
shocks from 0.031 to 0.044 will generate a 4.3 per cent sectoral job reallocation rate in
the new steady-state equilibrium. The increase in the standard deviation of sectoral
shocks is achieved by increasing the highest productivity level a sector can realize
and decreasing the lowest productivity level a sector can realize. Unlike the previous
experiments involving the idiosyncratic shock, the transition probabilities are not al-
tered.
The results are shown in Table 12. Firms in the most productive sector have become
more productive relative to the baseline scenario, and ﬁrms in the least productive
sector have become lessproductive. Once again, because of the convexity of the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt function in shocks, permanent employment rises more in the most productive
sector than it falls in the least productive sector. As a result, aggregate permanent
employment increases, as does the equilibrium wage rate. The increase in the wage
rate and the increase in the average number of permanent workers per ﬁrm in the
most productive sector leads to a decline in the number of temporary workers.
Greater dispersion in the sectoral productivity shock leads to more job reallocation
in permanent workers than in the baseline. The rate of job reallocation for temporary
workers declines slightly because there are relatively fewer temporary workers. The
change in the composition of job reallocation leads to a 5 per cent increase (from 0.042
to 0.044) in the aggregate adjustment costs as a fraction of output. This relatively
small increase in aggregate adjustment costs is not surprising as idiosyncratic shocks
remain the main driver of reallocation, even with the increased dispersion in sectoral
shocks.
However, the model with temporary workers still shows some increase in adjust-
ment costs when sectoral shocks become more disperse. This is not the case in the
model with no temporary workers (Table 12).22 An increase in the dispersion of sec-
tor shocks in this model hardly increases the aggregate adjustment costs at all. This
22In the baseline experiment with no temporary workers, the sectoral job reallocation rate is 4.0
per cent. Thus the new steady state sectoral reallocation rate should be 5.0 per cent. We ﬁnd that the
standard deviation of sectoral shocks needs to rise from 0.031 to 0.044 to generate this increase.29
is despite the fact that job reallocation for all workers does rise in response to more
sectoral dispersion, albeit not as much as in the model with temporary workers. This
demonstrates that to properly evaluate changes in welfare when permanent workers
are disproportionately affected, one must take temporary workers into account.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Thispaperdocumentsthe role oftemporary employmentinlabor adjustmentatthe
micro level, as well as job turnover in general. The data shows that temporary work-
ers normally account for a disproportionate amount of reallocation. We demonstrate
in a simple model of infrequent labor adjustment that ignoring temporary workers
leads to estimates of adjustment costs parameters that are much lower than when
temporary workers are taken into account. We also show that aggregate adjustment
costs will be underestimated when temporary workers are not accounted for in sit-
uations where a change in the economic environment disproportionately affects per-
manent workers. An example of such a change is the increased sectoral reallocation
in Canada due to the commodity price boom and the appreciation of the Canadian
dollar.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that an increase in the volatility of ﬁrm-level growth isa good
candidate for explaining the increase in the temporary employment rate in Canada.
More evidence on the change in ﬁrm volatility, however, needs to be examined. First,
a more representative sample of ﬁrms must be used to calculate the change in the
volatility of ﬁrm growth rates. Second, the nature of the increase in the volatility must
bedetermined.Thispapershows thatanincrease indispersion dueto more persistent
shocks does not increase temporary employment. More persistence actually encour-
ages the use of permanent workers. Temporary employment increases only when the
standard deviation of the error term in the idiosyncratic shock process increases. This
change leads to greater uncertainty and more use of temporary workers.
Of course, more work also needs to be done to further understand the role of tem-
porary workers. We point out two possible directions for further study. First, our
model has ignored the role of worker ﬂow and search frictions. The model assumes
that all workers are the same ex-ante and that the workers are indifferent between
taking a permanent job and a temporary job. This certainly neglects the question of30
why a worker is willing to take a temporary job. Second, job turnover in our model is
mainlydrivenbythe labouradjustment costs, giventhe productivity shock processes.
A complementary approach would be to better model how the ﬁrm manager’s expec-
tations on future productivity shocks are formed. As Ono and Sullivan (2006) show,
a ﬁrm is more likely to hire temporary workers if the ﬁrm manager thinks the ﬁrm’s
proﬁtability shock is transitory. A better understanding of the interaction between
productivity shocks and labor adjustment costs is expected to bring us closer to the
true story behind the existence of temporary employment in the economy.31
APPENDIX A: PROOFS
A.1. Proposition 1
PROOF: Let the value function without hiring and ﬁring costs be   V(z,ε,k,n,n−1).
First,   V is concave in n, by the assumption production function. We ﬁrst obtain the
ﬁrst order necessary conditions. Suppose the establishment hires permanent workers.
The ﬁrst-order necessary condition is
  Vn(z,ε,k,n,n−1) − τh2 = 0,
from whichweobtain optimal n(z,ε,k,n−1) > n−1.Byconcavity of   V,   Vn(z,ε,k,n−1,n−1) >
τh. If the establishment ﬁres permanent workers, the ﬁrst-order necessary condition
is
  Vn(z,ε,k,n,n−1) + τf2w = 0,
from whichweobtain optimal n(z,ε,k,n−1) < n−1.Byconcavity of   V,   Vn(z,ε,k,n−1,n−1) <
−τf2w. Q.E.D.32
APPENDIX B: TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLE 1. Summary Statistics From the Workplace Employee Survey (2001-2005)
All Manufacturing Other goods Services
Temporary job rate (%) 13.5 8.3 23.4 13.7
% of establishments with temporary jobs 34.9 42.4 46.8 32.4
Average temporary job rate
across establishments (%)
11.6 9.8 18.2 11.0
Average temporary job rate
for establishments with
temporary jobs (%)
33.2 23.1 38.8 33.833
TABLE 2. Incidence and Rate of Temporary Workers on Plant Characteristics
Presence of temporary

























































Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Both regression includes year and industry dummies.
1. Probit model; indicator variable is 1 if plant has temporary workers; marginal effects are
shown.
2. OLS regression for plants with temporary workers.34





∆Permanent < 0,∆Temporary < 0 4.5 6.4 7.0 3.9
∆Permanent < 0,∆Temporary = 0 12.8 14.2 10.0 13.0
∆Permanent < 0,∆Temporary > 0 5.9 7.4 7.4 5.5
∆Permanent = 0,∆Temporary < 0 4.1 4.7 4.6 4.0
∆Permanent = 0,∆Temporary = 0 20.2 14.0 15.2 21.6
∆Permanent = 0,∆Temporary > 0 4.8 3.4 4.2 5.0
∆Permanent > 0,∆Temporary < 0 8.0 7.8 10.3 7.8
∆Permanent > 0,∆Temporary = 0 14.4 15.5 12.5 14.5
∆Permanent > 0,∆Temporary > 0 25.3 26.5 28.9 24.735
TABLE 4. Median Revenue Growth by Employment Change Regimes (%)
Permanent Temporary
Decrease -1.0 2.8
No change 2.3 3.4
Increase 8.4 5.3
TABLE 5. Job Creation and Destruction Rates (%), All industries
Conventional deﬁnition
All workers Permanent Temporary
Job creation 10.2 8.1 5.3
Job destruction 9.2 6.4 6.2
Job reallocation 19.4 14.5 11.5
Rates excluding cases where permanent workers increase
(decrease) and temporary workers decrease (increase)
All workers Permanent Temporary
Job creation 8.2 5.1 3.1
Job destruction 7.1 4.1 3.0
Job reallocation 15.3 9.2 6.136
TABLE 6. Job Creation and Destruction Rates (%), Manufacturing
Conventional deﬁnition
All workers Permanent Temporary
Job creation 7.8 6.5 3.4
Job destruction 8.2 6.3 4.0
Job reallocation 16.0 12.8 7.4
Rates excluding cases where permanent workers increase
(decrease) and temporary workers decrease (increase)
All workers Permanent Temporary
Job creation 6.0 4.0 2.0
Job destruction 6.3 4.3 2.0
Job reallocation 12.3 8.3 4.037
TABLE 7. Job Creation and Destruction Rates (%), Other goods
Conventional deﬁnition
All workers Permanent Temporary
Job creation 14.4 9.9 8.6
Job destruction 12.3 7.2 9.2
Job reallocation 26.7 17.1 17.8
Rates excluding cases where permanent workers increase
(decrease) and temporary workers decrease (increase)
All workers Permanent Temporary
Job creation 11.8 6.4 5.4
Job destruction 9.0 4.2 4.8
Job reallocation 20.8 10.6 10.238
TABLE 8. Job Creation and Destruction Rates (%), Services
Conventional deﬁnition
All workers Permanent Temporary
Job creation 10.3 8.4 5.4
Job destruction 9.1 6.2 6.4
Job reallocation 19.4 14.6 11.8
Rates excluding cases where permanent workers increase
(decrease) and temporary workers decrease (increase)
All workers Permanent Temporary
Job creation 8.3 5.2 3.1
Job destruction 7.1 4.0 3.0
Job reallocation 15.4 9.2 6.239
TABLE 9. Baseline results
Moment Data Baseline No temporary workers
Adjustment cost/output — 0.042 0.047
Correlation (∆Permanent, ∆Temporary -0.378 -0.136 —
Fraction of plants with temporary workers 0.35 0.153 —
Temporary employment rate 0.135 0.092 —
Job creation permanent workers 0.081 0.086 0.139
Job destruction permanent workers 0.064 0.086 0.139
Job creation temporary workers 0.053 0.064 —
Job destruction temporary workers 0.062 0.064 —
Job creation all workers 0.102 0.139 0.139
Job destruction all workers 0.092 0.139 0.139
TABLE 10. Effects of a 10 percent increase in ﬁring cost
Moment Data Baseline τf2
Adjustment cost/output – 0.042 0.042
Correlation (∆Perm., ∆Temp.) -0.378 -0.136 -0.134
Fraction of plants with temporary workers 0.35 0.153 0.153
Temporary employment rate 0.135 0.092 0.096
Job creation permanent workers 0.081 0.086 0.083
Job destruction permanent workers 0.064 0.086 0.083
Job creation temporary workers 0.053 0.064 0.067
Job destruction temporary workers 0.062 0.064 0.067
Job creation all workers 0.102 0.139 0.139
Job destruction all workers 0.092 0.139 0.139
Note: Firing cost parameter τf2 is increased by 10 percent.40
TABLE 11. Shock volatility and job Reallocation
Moment Data Baseline ρ ση
Adjustment cost/output – 0.042 0.050 0.052
Correlation (∆Perm., ∆Temp.) -0.378 -0.136 -0.164 -0.151
Fraction of plants with temporary workers 0.35 0.153 0.174 0.182
Temporary employment rate 0.135 0.092 0.085 0.112
Job creation permanent workers 0.081 0.086 0.110 0.114
Job destruction permanent workers 0.064 0.086 0.110 0.114
Job creation temporary workers 0.053 0.064 0.056 0.077
Job destruction temporary workers 0.062 0.064 0.056 0.077
Job creation all workers 0.102 0.139 0.153 0.175
Job destruction all workers 0.092 0.139 0.153 0.175
Changes in plant-level shocks are made by respectively by increasing ρ and ση so that the
standard deviation of the plant-level shock increases by 10 per cent.
TABLE 12. Sectoral shock and job Reallocation
Moment Data Baseline z No Temp. worker z
Adjustment cost/output — 0.042 0.044 0.047 0.047
Correlation (∆Permanent, ∆Temporary -0.378 -0.136 -0.137
Fraction of plants with temporary workers 0.35 0.153 0.148 — –
Temporary employment rate 0.135 0.092 0.091 — –
Job creation permanent workers 0.081 0.086 0.090 0.139 0.140
Job destruction permanent workers 0.064 0.086 0.090 0.139 0.140
Job creation temporary workers 0.053 0.064 0.063 — –
Job destruction temporary workers 0.062 0.064 0.063 — –
Job creation all workers 0.102 0.139 0.141 0.139 0.140
Job destruction all workers 0.092 0.139 0.141 0.139 0.140
Changes in sectoral shock z are made so that in each case the sectoral job reallocation rate
increases by 25 percent.41
FIGURE 1. Policy function42
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